Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value

DOI10.1007/s11238-019-09687-7zbMath1410.91302OpenAlexW2775620190WikidataQ128465246 ScholiaQ128465246MaRDI QIDQ2422653

Manfred Besner

Publication date: 20 June 2019

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82990/1/MPRA_paper_82990.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cost allocationproportionalitydividends(weighted) Shapley valueplayer splittingproportional Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (10)

Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions ⋮ Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value ⋮ Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set ⋮ Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution ⋮ The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures ⋮ Compromising between the proportional and equal division values ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Extensions of solution concepts by means of muliplicative \(\epsilon\)-tax games
• On weighted Shapley values
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• The proportional value for positive cooperative games
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
• A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value
• On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
• A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Allocation of Cost Savings in a Three-Level Supply Chain with Demand Information Sharing: A Cooperative-Game Approach

This page was built for publication: Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value