Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0654-6zbMath1411.91222OpenAlexW2903643442WikidataQ128701237 ScholiaQ128701237MaRDI QIDQ2424248

Clemens Thielen, Philipp Weinschenk, Stephan Westphal, Sven O. Krumke

Publication date: 24 June 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0654-6

zbMATH Keywords

dominant strategiesaugmented revelation mechanismfull implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Implementation in differential information economies
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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