School choice with neighbors
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Publication:2425195
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001zbMath1417.91381OpenAlexW2925197044WikidataQ128175233 ScholiaQ128175233MaRDI QIDQ2425195
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001
Related Items (6)
Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Centralized allocation in multiple markets ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets
Cites Work
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- On cores and indivisibility
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
- Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Unnamed Item
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