Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.002zbMath1137.91332OpenAlexW2079096763MaRDI QIDQ2427136

Fei Song

Publication date: 8 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

trustexperimentreciprocitydecision-makingbehavioral game theorygroup-representativeindividual-group discontinuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (3)

Group cooperation under uncertainty ⋮ Representing others in a public good game ⋮ Teams promise but do not deliver

Cites Work

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• Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
• Social influence in the sequential dictator game
• How to identify trust and reciprocity.
• Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
• Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
• Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation

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