Core concepts for incomplete market economies
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Publication:2427860
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.07.005zbMath1239.91008OpenAlexW2149138194MaRDI QIDQ2427860
Helga Habis, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 18 April 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108223
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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