Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0112-4zbMath1180.91172OpenAlexW2089349773MaRDI QIDQ2431829

Shigehiro Serizawa, Hideyuki Mizobuchi

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13358

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods ⋮ Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Cites Work

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• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule

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