Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0119-xzbMath1180.91112OpenAlexW2058073069MaRDI QIDQ2431836

Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0119-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Dictatorial domains
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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