Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0098-yzbMath1098.91035OpenAlexW2140855067MaRDI QIDQ2432496

Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando A. Tohmé

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/237.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Single-crossing choice correspondences ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles ⋮ Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result ⋮ A characterization of the single-crossing domain ⋮ Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals ⋮ Majority voting on restricted domains ⋮ A characterization of preference domains that are single-crossing and maximal Condorcet ⋮ The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates ⋮ Condorcet winners and social acceptability ⋮ Existence of equilibria in a decentralized two-level supply chain ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents ⋮ Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks ⋮ Combinatorial voter control in elections ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

Cites Work

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• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule

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