Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0099-xzbMath1108.91025OpenAlexW2044692536MaRDI QIDQ2432497

Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13744

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessPareto-efficiencysocial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods ⋮ Secure implementation in allotment economies ⋮ Immunity to credible deviations from the truth ⋮ The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization ⋮ Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ On the manipulability of equitable voting rules ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Group strategyproofness in queueing models ⋮ Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies ⋮ The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ Manipulation through bribes ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

Cites Work

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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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• Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
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• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

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