Nash implementation via hyperfunctions

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0088-0zbMath1102.91030OpenAlexW1990286112MaRDI QIDQ2432512

M. Remzi Sanver, İpek Özkal-Sanver

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0088-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions

Cites Work

• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

This page was built for publication: Nash implementation via hyperfunctions