Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
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Publication:2434348
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.05.002zbMath1288.91107OpenAlexW3121713569MaRDI QIDQ2434348
Xavier Vives, Alexander Kovalenkov
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2446.pdf
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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