The e-mail game phenomenon

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010zbMath1281.91038OpenAlexW2060872672MaRDI QIDQ2435897

Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

critical typescommon knowledgegames with incomplete informationhigher-order beliefse-mail game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

The robust selection of rationalizability ⋮ Value‐based distance between information structures ⋮ Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

Cites Work

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