Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.003zbMath1281.91020OpenAlexW3121240766MaRDI QIDQ2436296

Aviad Heifetz, Burkhard C. Schipper, Martin Meier

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/46A1WHknkexr4Vh9rNFHcdau/09-10.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

extensive-form rationalizabilityunawarenessextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (36)

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Cites Work

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• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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