Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
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Publication:2436303
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.002zbMath1282.91071DBLPjournals/geb/BeckKQS13OpenAlexW2155553078WikidataQ37088099 ScholiaQ37088099MaRDI QIDQ2436303
Matthias Sutter, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Adrian Beck, Jianying Qiu
Publication date: 24 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.002
promisesexperimentsguilt aversionmoney burningcredence goodsbelief-dependent preferencespsychological forward induction
Related Items (9)
Exploiting the guilt aversion of others: do agents do it and is it effective? ⋮ Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs ⋮ Partner selection and the division of surplus: evidence from ultimatum and dictator experiments ⋮ On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money ⋮ Strategic framing to influence clients' risky decisions ⋮ Surprising gifts: theory and laboratory evidence ⋮ Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods ⋮ Guilt aversion in (new) games: does partners' payoff vulnerability matter? ⋮ The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Competition fosters trust
- Testing guilt aversion
- Bare promises: an experiment
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- Saliency of outside options in the lost wallet game
- The self-fulfilling property of trust: an experimental study
- Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
- Promises and Partnership
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