Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice

DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9360-zzbMath1284.91132OpenAlexW2095336506MaRDI QIDQ2436696

T. Nicolaus Tideman, Florenz Plassmann

Publication date: 25 February 2014

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9360-z

zbMATH Keywords

spatial modelmultinomial-Dirichlet distributionmodel of vote-casting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (3)

Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda compromise

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• Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
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