Bribery in voting with CP-nets

DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5zbMath1282.91095OpenAlexW1996949426MaRDI QIDQ2436697

Francesca Rossi, Maria Silvia Pini, Nicholas Mattei, Kristen Brent Venable

Publication date: 25 February 2014

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choicebriberyCP-nets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets ⋮ Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets ⋮ How hard is safe bribery? ⋮ On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions ⋮ Local distance constrained bribery in voting ⋮ Expressive efficiency of two kinds of specific CP-nets ⋮ Frugal bribery in voting ⋮ Complexity results for preference aggregation over (\(m\))CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting

Uses Software

• CP-nets

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• The paradox of multiple elections
• On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
• Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying
• Swap Bribery
• How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: Bribery in voting with CP-nets