Approximately classic judgement aggregation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2436699
DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9358-6zbMath1294.91047arXiv1008.3829OpenAlexW3101283436MaRDI QIDQ2436699
Publication date: 25 February 2014
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1008.3829
computational social choicejudgement aggregationapproximate aggregationinconsistency indexcomputational judgement aggregationdependency indextruth-functional agendas
Related Items
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
- Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
- Group identification
- Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
- Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation
- Introduction to judgment aggregation
- Aggregation of binary evaluations
- A quantitative discursive dilemma
- Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
- Aggregation of equivalence relations
- Algebraic aggregation theory
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Self-testing/correcting with applications to numerical problems
- A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
- Arrow's theorem as a corollary
- A quantitative Arrow theorem
- Aggregation of non-binary evaluations
- Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas
- Information and preference aggregation
- Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
- Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
- Democratic answers to complex questions -- an epistemic perspective
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
