Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
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Publication:2437176
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.009zbMath1284.91299OpenAlexW2034588657MaRDI QIDQ2437176
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/127
Related Items (7)
Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents ⋮ Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium ⋮ The aviation technology two-sided matching with the expected time based on the probabilistic linguistic preference relations ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets ⋮ An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference ⋮ A matching method for second-hand goods exchange considering loss aversion of buyer and seller in e-brokerage
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