Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005zbMath1282.91129OpenAlexW1969408115MaRDI QIDQ2437817

Ruben Juarez

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcost sharingtie-breaking rulegroup strategyproof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (17)

Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ Beyond Moulin mechanisms ⋮ Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good ⋮ Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? ⋮ Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation ⋮ Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ Modularity and greed in double auctions ⋮ Routing-proofness in congestion-prone networks ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing ⋮ An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method ⋮ Free intermediation in resource transmission ⋮ Coalitional efficient profit-sharing ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Cites Work

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