Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
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Publication:2437826
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.014zbMath1282.91143OpenAlexW3122762142MaRDI QIDQ2437826
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.014
Related Items (3)
Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
Cites Work
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- Asymmetric Auctions
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
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