Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.08.011zbMath1282.91173OpenAlexW2152186589MaRDI QIDQ2437834

Sarah Auster

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19355/ECO_2011_31.pdf?sequence=1

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsmoral hazardunawareness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Introspective unawareness and observable choice ⋮ Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness ⋮ Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result ⋮ Multi-task agency with unawareness ⋮ Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance ⋮ Unawareness without AU introspection ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies

Cites Work

• Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
• Multi-task agency with unawareness
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Interactive unawareness
• Information structures with unawareness
• Unawareness and bankruptcy: a general equilibrium model
• Unawareness and partitional information structures
• Awareness and partitional information structures
• Unawareness of theorems
• A canonical model for interactive unawareness
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness
• Incentives for Unaware Agents
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

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