Similar bidders in takeover contests

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.010zbMath1283.91076OpenAlexW3125487812MaRDI QIDQ2437838

Han T. J. Smit, Sebastian Gryglewicz, Yun Dai, Wouter De Maeseneire

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.010

zbMATH Keywords

experimentinterdependent valuationsinformation externalitycompetition intensitytakeover contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study*
• Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data
• Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
• Mergers and Acquisitions: An Experimental Analysis of Synergies, Externalities and Dynamics
• A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*
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