Investments as signals of outside options

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001zbMath1296.91250OpenAlexW2039123216WikidataQ60608970 ScholiaQ60608970MaRDI QIDQ2439918

Susanne Goldlücke, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractssignaling gameshold-up problemrelationship-specific investments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Portfolio theory (91G10)

Related Items (6)

Search equilibrium with unobservable investment ⋮ Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory ⋮ The management of innovation: experimental evidence ⋮ Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm ⋮ On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries ⋮ \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership

Cites Work

• Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
• Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Convex Analysis

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