Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.005zbMath1292.91015OpenAlexW2143897353MaRDI QIDQ2439925

Hiroshi Uno, Vladyslav Nora

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

potentialrobustnessincomplete informationteam-maximin equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• An improved algorithm for detecting potential games
• Decompositions and potentials for normal form games
• Best response equivalence
• Congestion games with malicious players
• Team-maxmin equilibria
• A Shapley value representation of potential games
• Potential games
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Network design and defence
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• When selfish meets evil
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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