Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.07.001zbMath1283.91074OpenAlexW2008904529MaRDI QIDQ2440463

Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni, Vincenzo Valori

Publication date: 18 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/flo/workingpapers/storicodimad/2012/dimadwp2012-06.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

information revelationasymmetric auctionsprocurementdiscriminatory policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects ⋮ Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions

Cites Work

• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions
• Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
• Asymmetric Auctions

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