Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.04.005zbMath1284.91064OpenAlexW1963524276MaRDI QIDQ2441216

Antonella Ianni

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7155

zbMATH Keywords

learningreplicator dynamicslaw of effectstrict Nash equilibriumpower law of practice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Decentralized pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games ⋮ Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning

Cites Work

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