On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.04.003zbMath1284.91169OpenAlexW1993299296MaRDI QIDQ2441221

Andrés Carvajal, Natalia González

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

testabilityNash bargainingrevealed preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games ⋮ Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games ⋮ A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization

Cites Work

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• On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
• Revealed Preference Tests of the Cournot Model
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• The testable implications of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities

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