A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.07.003zbMath1284.91044OpenAlexW2038156956MaRDI QIDQ2441235

Alessandro Gioffré, Gabriele Camera

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles/172

zbMATH Keywords

social normscooperationrandom matchinggrim trigger

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching

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