Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
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Publication:2441239
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.004zbMath1284.91130OpenAlexW1971123254MaRDI QIDQ2441239
Marc Vorsatz, Jorge Alcalde-Unzu
Publication date: 24 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18602
Related Items (4)
Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal ⋮ A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives ⋮ Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
Cites Work
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- Weighted approval voting
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- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
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- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- A live experiment on approval voting
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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