Fighting corruption: to precommit or not?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.04.025zbMath1284.91487OpenAlexW2056768673MaRDI QIDQ2442384

Fabien Ngendakuriyo, Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 3 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.025

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamescorruptioncommitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (4)

Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition ⋮ Building Efficient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game ⋮ Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government? ⋮ Mean-field-game model of corruption

Cites Work

• Dynamic rent-seeking games

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