The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00828-2zbMath1284.91063OpenAlexW2024549569MaRDI QIDQ2442560

Haruo H. Horaguchi

Publication date: 3 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00828-2

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumbounded rationalityinformation processing cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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