What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
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Publication:2442577
DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2013.04.005zbMath1284.91187OpenAlexW2017701133MaRDI QIDQ2442577
Vadim Marmer, Pai Xu, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 4 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/189518
Nonparametric hypothesis testing (62G10) Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (11)
A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS ⋮ Auctions with selective entry ⋮ TESTING FOR A GENERAL CLASS OF FUNCTIONAL INEQUALITIES ⋮ IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION IN A THIRD-PRICE AUCTION MODEL ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator ⋮ Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable ⋮ Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach ⋮ Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions ⋮ Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions
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