Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.002zbMath1290.91060OpenAlexW2058593513MaRDI QIDQ2442835

Yoshio Kamijo, T. Nihonsugi, Yukihiko Funaki, Ai Takeuchi

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsanctionlinear public goods gamepunishment institutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game ⋮ Preordered service in contract enforcement

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games
• Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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