Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
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Publication:2442843
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.016zbMath1290.91066OpenAlexW1968905048MaRDI QIDQ2442843
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.016
Related Items (4)
Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Cites Work
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- A note on strong unimodality and dispersivity
- Dispersive distributions, and the connection between dispersivity and strong unimodality
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- Asymmetric Auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
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