Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.006zbMath1292.91084OpenAlexW2052955025MaRDI QIDQ2442851

John H. Kagel, Yuanchuan Lien, Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

package auctionsthreshold problemCCA auctionsSAA auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis ⋮ Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance ⋮ Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

Cites Work

• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
• Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Combinatorial auction design

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