Robustness to strategic uncertainty
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Publication:2442856
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.018zbMath1290.91014OpenAlexW3122220185MaRDI QIDQ2442856
Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp910.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (6)
Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game ⋮ On the existence of limit admissible equilibria in discontinuous games ⋮ Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces ⋮ Robustness to strategic uncertainty ⋮ Ambiguity and price competition ⋮ Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games
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