Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.010zbMath1296.91126OpenAlexW3122706146MaRDI QIDQ2444696

Alia Gizatulina, Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 10 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E0E-2

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designbelief functionscorrelated informationabstract type spacesBDP property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Spaces of measures, convergence of measures (28A33) Convergence of probability measures (60B10)

Related Items (6)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces ⋮ Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents ⋮ Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

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