A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
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Publication:2444698
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.006zbMath1296.91173OpenAlexW2027375228MaRDI QIDQ2444698
Publication date: 10 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.006
equivalencerandom serial dictatorshiprandom assignmentindivisible goodstop trading cyclesserial dictatorship in groups
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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- Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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