Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.05.020zbMath1284.91410OpenAlexW1992290742MaRDI QIDQ2446255

Marcelo Sánchez

Publication date: 16 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.020

zbMATH Keywords

calibrationoptimal delegationwage settingcentral bank transparencymonetary strictness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Monetary accommodation and unemployment: why central bank transparency matters
• How much should central banks talk?: A new argument
• The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*

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