A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.001zbMath1285.91051OpenAlexW2120170567MaRDI QIDQ2447055

Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, Michael Peters

Publication date: 23 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncompeting mechanismsimplementable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand ⋮ Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets ⋮ Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Reciprocal contracting ⋮ On take it or leave it offers in common agency ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets ⋮ Private communication in competing mechanism games

Cites Work

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• Program equilibrium
• A commitment folk theorem
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Definable and Contractible Contracts
• Generation of Uniform Variates from Several Nearly Uniformly Distributed Variables
• Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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