The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
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Publication:2447152
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8zbMath1303.91125OpenAlexW2056756442MaRDI QIDQ2447152
Publication date: 24 April 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8
Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Related Items (37)
Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach ⋮ Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ An alternative characterization of top trading cycles ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study ⋮ The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem ⋮ Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ New axioms for immediate acceptance ⋮ Cognitive ability and games of school choice ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types ⋮ Making just school assignments ⋮ School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ The modified Boston mechanism ⋮ Size versus fairness in the assignment problem ⋮ A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
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