Voting as a signaling device

DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0764-0zbMath1298.91084OpenAlexW2045153630MaRDI QIDQ2447162

R. Emre Aytimur, Robert Schwager, Aristotelis Boukouras

Publication date: 24 April 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/9338555/ABS_voting_as_signal_Accepted_Manuscript_2_.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signalingvotingsocial interactionturnoutelectoral incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Voting as a signaling device

Cites Work

• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Welfare reducing polls
• Civic duty and political advertising
• Voting as a signaling device

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