The strategic sincerity of approval voting

DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0775-xzbMath1291.91065OpenAlexW2014242653MaRDI QIDQ2447170

Matías Núñez

Publication date: 24 April 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationPoisson gamesapproval votingsincerity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Implementation via approval mechanisms ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Reaching consensus through approval bargaining ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Electoral institutions with impressionable voters

Cites Work

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