The strategic sincerity of approval voting
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Publication:2447170
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0775-xzbMath1291.91065OpenAlexW2014242653MaRDI QIDQ2447170
Publication date: 24 April 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x
Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (9)
Implementation via approval mechanisms ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Reaching consensus through approval bargaining ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
Cites Work
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