Matching through position auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009zbMath1285.91102OpenAlexW2032699496MaRDI QIDQ2447275

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 25 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

matchingauctionsintermediationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Informational hold up and intermediaries ⋮ Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ Matching with peer monitoring ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ Synchronized matching with incomplete information ⋮ Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

Cites Work

• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
• Monopolistic Signal Provision
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Asymptotic Statistics
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Coarse Matching

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