Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004zbMath1285.91052OpenAlexW3124786050MaRDI QIDQ2447276

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date: 25 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201109.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsrepeated gamescollusionbid rotation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ First-best collusion without communication ⋮ Efficient chip strategies in repeated games ⋮ Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions

Cites Work

• Private monitoring in auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Optimal Auction Design
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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