Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption

DOI10.1007/s10479-013-1431-3zbMath1291.91185OpenAlexW2051315113MaRDI QIDQ2449366

Abhra Roy, Jomon Aliyas Paul

Publication date: 8 May 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1431-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (5)

A terrorism-based differential game: Nash differential game ⋮ The development of a differential game related to terrorism: MIN-MAX differential game ⋮ Optimization method in counter terrorism: min-max zero-sum differential game approach ⋮ A study on Nash-collative differential game of \(N\)-players for counterterrorism ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Interdependent security
• Contest success functions
• A bilevel mixed-integer program for critical infrastructure protection planning
• Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game

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