No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0553-2zbMath1287.91079OpenAlexW2170763724MaRDI QIDQ2450141

Uzi Segal, Joseph M. Ostroy

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0553-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
• Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
• Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Manipulation through bribes
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

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