Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
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Publication:2450150
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0564-zzbMath1287.91058OpenAlexW2062057342MaRDI QIDQ2450150
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0564-z
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