Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0555-0zbMath1287.91064arXiv1009.0300OpenAlexW2197861567WikidataQ61586227 ScholiaQ61586227MaRDI QIDQ2450151

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1009.0300

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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