A new old solution for weak tournaments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2450153
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0561-2zbMath1287.91054OpenAlexW1990925071MaRDI QIDQ2450153
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/44306
Related Items (4)
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Robustness of the median voter result
- Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
- Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- Choosing from a tournament
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
- STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
This page was built for publication: A new old solution for weak tournaments
